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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000374

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DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA,  
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING  
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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [ASEC](#)

SUBJECT: LIBYAN FM SUPPORTS RELOCATING DOHA PEACE PROCESS  
TO DARFUR

Classified By: Classified by CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

#### SUMMARY

1. (C) During a February 1 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Gration, Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa said that Darfur's rebels had been spoiled by media attention and their plush lifestyles in Qatar. He advocated moving Darfur peace talks from Doha to Darfur, bringing in a specialized team of regional players to observe the process, but making the Government of Sudan interact directly with the parties and shoulder more responsibility. He described Darfur as an Islamic struggle between President Omar el-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, from which JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim emerging as an ambitious side player worth engaging. End Summary.

2. (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General J. Scott Gration travelled to Addis Ababa from January 27-February 2, 2010 to attend the AU Summit with the U.S. delegation.

On Darfuri Rebels in Doha: "Money Spoils the Individuals"

3. (C) FM Musa began by discussing the reasons why the Darfur peace talks were not succeeding. He said that the Darfuri rebels, having found themselves in five-star hotels and in front of cameras, are using the peace talks as a way to earn a living. In his experience with rebel movements, Musa said, "money spoils the individuals." Abdul Wahid has used Darfur as a personal platform, speaking like an official, holding meetings, appearing on television and al-Jazeera, and building a "larger-than-life personality." When NGOs come into Darfur, Musa said, they side with the Darfuri parties. As a result, Musa believed, the rebels feel they have international support behind them, which increases the ceiling of negotiations. Musa also faulted the Qataris' approach, calling it a "media show."

Moving Darfur Peace Talks to Darfur

4. (C) Eschewing Doha, Musa believed there was "no alternative place" to holding Darfur peace talks than in Darfur. He envisioned that a "specialized team" of regional

players—including Libya, Egypt, the United States, and the United Nations—who understand the area and the mentality of the people would observe the process. At its core, he believed the Government of Sudan should negotiate directly with the parties because "the Government has responsibility and should shoulder it." Musa also stated that those hurting the cause for peace should be punished, and specifically that Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir and rebels "not contributing to the solution" should be sanctioned. Musa said he told the French that they were contributing to the problem by harboring Abdul Wahid. Finally, he said the Chad-Sudan border agreement of 15 January should be encouraged.

Khalil's Ambitions and Turabi vs. Bashir;  
Gosh to "Retire Quietly"

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15. (C) Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim, Musa said, has an Islamist ideology, money, and national agenda propelling his desire to take Bashir's place. Moreover, Musa said, he's not alone; Musa believed that Khalil was part of National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi's organization. "What happened in Darfur," Musa said, "is a struggle between Bashir and Turabi," and Turabi maneuvered Khalil in Darfur by making it "the other side's battle, not his." Musa said that the Special Envoy could empower himself by talking to Khalil, but that if he talks, the SE should "talk to him strongly."

16. (C) Discussing internal Sudanese politics, Musa stated that former Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Gosh played a

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disruptive role on the Chad/Sudan border. Gosh, Musa said, was his friend but that his replacement, Mohammad Attah, "was better." Musa predicted that Gosh would "retire quietly."

Southern Sudan and "the Heart of the African Problem"

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17. (C) Musa said that the South had inflamed Darfur by coordinating with Kenya to funnel arms into Darfur when problems started there. He said that there is great risk in Southern independence, and that the South will be at the mercy of other nations, such as Kenya, because they lack the resources to make a state. The FM said that Sudan is the border point between "black and white, Islam and other religions," which Musa concluded, is "the heart of the African problem."

Participants in Foreign Minister  
Musa Kusa Meeting:

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18. (U) General J, Scott Gration, U.S. special Envoy to Sudan  
Cameron Hudson, Director of Operations, Office of the U.S.  
Special Envoy to Sudan  
Miriam Estrin, Special Assistant to the Special Envoy, Office  
of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan  
Kathryn Pongonis, Deputy Political/Economic Counselor, U.S.  
Embassy Addis Ababa

19. (U) SE Gration's Office has cleared on this cable.  
YATES